Julia Clark – Google+ – We don’t run away, we run fearless , to danger to help our…


Inflammatory discourse does not make what you write truthy.

It no longer matters how the Corruption Campaign began in Syria. Mr. Assad\’s reaction to it showed that the original statements from Syria was in fact true. And I will be harsher than the original plea, Mr. Assad is vile.

After the Mr. Assad viciously attacked The Campaign with no interest in the humanity of Syria , only interest in keeping his power, I researched Mr. Assad.

What I did not know was Mr. Assad and much of his family, was a theatrical presentation created by an USA based PR company. His creation of a character for public consumption in itself is not vile, but had that been known all information that showed Mr. Assad in a positive light would have been subject to higher level of scrutiny.

As for your statement of that the manufactoredness of the original protests is conspired, cursing does not make that go way. It is so common knowledge that you point out that it is classed in with conspiracy theories.

The balloons that were seen in the Syrian protests photos showed up again in the Million Mask March. The source of the promotion of balloons for use as \” a bringing together\” in the MMM is from  very questionable PR firm with questionable unethical practices. BTW, the use of balloons does not negate corruption of intent.

It was kismet that Mr. Assad broke character and exhibited his vile nature. His vile nature might not have come to light had the balloon promoting PR company not had an interest in creating an informational gathering campaign. It was unfortunate for that PR company. Read Million Man March – page 4 – The Occupations Statement for more information.  https://oolith.wordpress.com/2013/11/08/million-mask-march-page-4-the-occupations-statement/

The name of your account suggests you are a astroturfer account. Nevertheless, I will give you a platform on my channel for a bit of time.

via Julia Clark – Google+ – We don’t run away, we run fearless , to danger to help our….

Take a look at Al Qaeda’s Syrian oil paradise: big profits and big plans for an “Islamic caliphate” – Vocativ

There’s no disputing the fact that jihadi groups in Syria—propped up by weapons and petrodollars from wealthy Persian Gulf monarchies such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar—are the dominant rebel force on the battlefield, and have been for some time. But with the civil war now two-and-a-half years old, a new element has emerged in the bloody, multidimensional conflict: self-sustaining jihadi fiefdoms.

A young man known as the “emir of gas” spoke with The Guardian in July from the Ash Shaddadi natural gas refinery in the country’s eastern Hasaka province. The rebel commander now controls the refinery’s output after militants affiliated with Al Qaeda from Jabhat al-Nusra pushed out Syrian army troops.

His designs for the surrounding area are pretty clear, as the paper reported: ”Go and ask the people in the streets whether there is a liberated town or city anywhere in Syria that is ruled as efficiently as this one,” he boasted. “There is electricity, water and bread and security. Inshallah, this will be the nucleus of a new Syrian Islamic caliphate!”

Following up on this, reporters for McClatchy newspapers recently traveled to the refinery and found that things haven’t changed much in the past few months. They wrote: “Today, Nusra runs the town. It controls the grain silos, the cotton warehouses, and most important the region’s gas and oil output. Yet the biggest windfall from victory may have been the proceeds from the sale of some 400 major construction vehicles, which they captured when they overran state facilities in January. The sale of the equipment netted 4 billion Syrian pounds, almost $40 million at the time, according to local Free Syrian Army commanders.”

However, as with just about everything in Syria today, things are a bit murky. Residents of regime-held areas of Damascus have reported seeing fuel from rebel-held areas being sold on the black market, at a discount, apparently because of the poor quality of jihadi refining techniques.

More from McClatchy: “That approach is different from what’s taking place in Deir el Zour, about 80 miles to the south, where the Free Syrian Army accepted an arrangement under which gas is shipped to the Syrian government, which distributes it throughout the country. The government, in turn, pays the salaries of the employees who keep the plant going.”

So, what does a self-sufficient jihadi paradise in the heart of the Middle East look like? Here are some pictures to give you an idea.

All photos by Andree Kaiser/MCT.

via Take a look at Al Qaeda’s Syrian oil paradise: big profits and big plans for an “Islamic caliphate” – Vocativ.

Chambliss’ Reply Concerning the Syrian Revolution To The Julia Clark Organization

Dear Honorable Clark:

Thank you for contacting me regarding Syria.  I appreciate your concern on this important issue.

As you are aware, in March 2011, Syrian protesters began calling for political reforms and the reinstatement of civil rights under the corrupt regime of President Bashar al-Assad. Since that time, the situation in Syria has devolved into a civil war between pro-government forces loyal to the Assad regime and a coalition of rebel groups killing tens of thousands of Syrians, mostly civilians.

This instability threatens the security of the entire region.  Recent reports from the United Nations indicate that approximately 1.6 million people have been displaced by the civil war.  Many of these refugees are seeking safe haven in Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey, and Egypt.  It is imperative that the United States remains committed to joining with partner nations in providing humanitarian assistance to these displaced refugees.

U.S. Senator Saxby Chambliss, of Georgia.

U.S. Senator Saxby Chambliss, of Georgia. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

While I am deeply concerned about the regional effects of the Syrian conflict, I am very troubled by the threat of chemical weapons within Syria. Since August 2012, President Obama has stated that the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime would be a red line that the United States could not tolerate.  Since March 2013, we have received reports of the deployment of chemical weapons by forces loyal to President Assad; however President Obama failed to take any meaningful action to neutralize the threat posed by these weapons.  Compounding this problem is the increase in the number of Islamist fighters who are traveling from all over the world to gain control of Syria.  In this way, they can have a territory closer to the United States and Europe to carry out their mission of attacking the Western Hemisphere. The world is looking to the United States to lead the effort to neutralize these dangerous threats to the region and elsewhere.  I encourage the President to work with Congress to immediately develop an appropriate response to restore stability to this troubled region.

Currently, there are a number of legislative measures pending in Congress relating to U.S. involvement in Syria. My support for any foreign aid or deployment of U.S. troops will continue to be based on relevance to our national security and other important U.S. strategic interests. Furthermore, I remain concerned about the effect of multiple deployments on our military personnel. As legislation regarding Syria comes before the Senate, I will keep your thoughts in mind.

If you would like to receive timely email alerts regarding the latest congressional actions and my weekly e-newsletter, please sign up via my web site at: www.chambliss.senate.gov. Please let me know whenever I may be of assistance.

9 questions about Syria you were too embarrassed to ask

9 questions about Syria you were too embarrassed to ask.

3. That’s horrible. But there are protests lots of places. How did it all go so wrong in Syria? And, please, just give me the short version.

That’s a complicated question, and there’s no single, definitive answer. This is the shortest possible version — stay with me, it’s worth it. You might say, broadly speaking, that there are two general theories. Both start with the idea that Syria has been a powder keg waiting to explode for decades and that it was set off, maybe inevitably, by the 2011 protests and especially by the government’s overly harsh crackdown.

Before we dive into the theories, you have to understand that the Syrian government really overreacted when peaceful protests started in mid-2011, slaughtering civilians unapologetically, which was a big part of how things escalated as quickly as they did. Assad learned this from his father. In 1982, Assad’s father and then-dictator Hafez al-Assad responded to a Muslim Brotherhood-led uprising in the city of Hama by leveling entire neighborhoods. He killed thousands of civilians, many of whom had nothing to do with the uprising. But it worked, and it looks like the younger Assad tried to reproduce it. His failure made the descent into chaos much worse.

Okay, now the theories for why Syria spiraled so wildly. The first is what you might call “sectarian re-balancing” or “the Fareed Zakaria case” for why Syria is imploding (he didn’t invent this argument but is a major proponent). Syria has artificial borders that were created by European colonial powers, forcing together an amalgam of diverse religious and ethnic groups. Those powers also tended to promote a minority and rule through it, worsening preexisting sectarian tensions.

Zakaria’s argument is that what we’re seeing in Syria is in some ways the inevitable re-balancing of power along ethnic and religious lines. He compares it to the sectarian bloodbath in Iraq after the United States toppled Saddam Hussein, after which a long-oppressed majority retook power from, and violently punished, the former minority rulers. Most Syrians are Sunni Arabs, but the country is run by members of a minority sect known as Alawites (they’re ethnic Arab but follow a smaller branch of Islam). The Alawite government rules through a repressive dictatorship and gives Alawites special privileges, which makes some Sunnis and other groups hate Alawites in general, which in turn makes Alawites fear that they’ll be slaughtered en masse if Assad loses the war. (There are other minorities as well, such as ethnic Kurds and Christian Arabs; too much to cover in one explainer.) Also, lots of Syrian communities are already organized into ethnic or religious enclaves, which means that community militias are also sectarian militias. That would explain why so much of the killing in Syria has developed along sectarian lines. It would also suggest that there’s not much anyone can do to end the killing because, in Zakaria’s view, this is a painful but unstoppable process of re-balancing power.

The second big theory is a bit simpler: that the Assad regime was not a sustainable enterprise and it’s clawing desperately on its way down. Most countries have some kind of self-sustaining political order, and it looked for a long time like Syria was held together by a cruel and repressive but basically stable dictatorship. But maybe it wasn’t stable; maybe it was built on quicksand. Bashar al-Assad’s father Hafez seized power in a coup in 1970 after two decades of extreme political instability. His government was a product of Cold War meddling and a kind of Arab political identity crisis that was sweeping the region. But he picked the losing sides of both: the Soviet Union was his patron, and he followed a hard-line anti-Western nationalist ideology that’s now mostly defunct. The Cold War is long over, and most of the region long ago made peace with Israel and the United States; the Assad regime’s once-solid ideological and geopolitical identity is hopelessly outdated. But Bashar al-Assad, who took power in 2000 when his father died, never bothered to update it. So when things started going belly-up two years ago, he didn’t have much to fall back on except for his ability to kill people.

9. Hi, there was too much text so I skipped to the bottom to find the big take-away. What’s going to happen?

Short-term maybe the United States and some allies will launch some limited, brief strikes against Syria and maybe they won’t. Either way, these things seem pretty certain in the long-term:

• The killing will continue, probably for years. There’s no one to sign a peace treaty on the rebel side, even if the regime side were interested, and there’s no foreseeable victory for either. Refugees will continue fleeing into neighboring countries, causing instability and an entire other humanitarian crisis as conditions in the camps worsen.

• Syria as we know it, an ancient place with a rich and celebrated culture and history, will be a broken, failed society, probably for a generation or more. It’s very hard to see how you rebuild a functioning state after this. Maybe worse, it’s hard to see how you get back to a working social contract where everyone agrees to get along.

• Russia will continue to block international action, the window for which has maybe closed anyway. The United States might try to pressure, cajole or even horse-trade Moscow into changing its mind, but there’s not much we can offer them that they care about as much as Syria.

• At some point the conflict will cool, either from a partial victory or from exhaustion. The world could maybe send in some peacekeepers or even broker a fragile peace between the various ethnic, religious and political factions. Probably the best model is Lebanon, which fought a brutal civil war that lasted 15 years from 1975 to 1990 and has been slowly, slowly recovering ever since. It had some bombings just last week.